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CHOICE OF LAW: WILL A WISCONSIN COURT
RECOGNIZE A VERMONT CIVIL UNION?
I. INTRODUCTION
It was not too long ago that interracial marriages were prohibited in
many states across the nation. The first case to successfully challenge
and strike down a state miscegenation statute, Loving v. Virginia,2 did
not come before the United States Supreme Court until 1967.'
Just as legal barriers have since been lifted for interracial couples
wishing to marry, legal recognition of marriage between parties of the
same gender may not be too far in the future.4 Developments in the past
decade in Hawaii, Alaska, and more notably Vermont, have propelled
this issue onto the legislative agenda in numerous states and the federal
government.- The debate over the recognition and prohibition of same-
sex unions is not, however, new.6 Several years ago, the nation's
1. Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial Marriage:
Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Law in North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557, 557-58 (1999) (recounting the stories of
several interracial couples who sought recognition of their marriages). In 1967, the Supreme
Court heard that there were sixteen states in the nation that explicitly prohibited interracial
marriages. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (listing the sixteen states which
punished interracial marriages at the time).
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Loving Court noted "[tihere can be no doubt that restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 12. In addition, the Court stated, "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations." Id.
3. Id. at 1. Numerous state courts cited public policy considerations to justify their
refusal to recognize interracial unions entered into in foreign jurisdictions. EUGENE F.
SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICt OF LAWS § 13.19, at 575-76 & n.14 (3d ed. 2000).
4. Id. § 13.19, at 574.
5. In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and since then
numerous state legislatures have passed little "domas" based on the federal act. See David 0.
Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition
Statutes in the "Same-Sex Marriage" Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 4-7 & n.29 (1998); see
Same-Sex Marriages Across the United State (May 25, 2000), available at
http://vww.CNN.com/2000ILAW/05/25/same.sex.marriages [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage
Laws] (discussing legislative action taken by states in recent years).
6. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION
1 (1997). As one commentator notes, the debate over same-sex marriages has spread from
the "soapbox" to the "ballot box." Domestic Relations-Same-Sex Couples-Vermont Creates
System of Civil Unions, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1421 & nn.1-2 (2001).
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spotlight shone on Hawaii, as the legal recognition of same-sex marriage
in Hawaii became a strong possibility.7
Vermont recently revolutionized the debate when the Vermont Civil
Union Bill became law in April of 2000. The bill grants same-sex
couples virtually the same rights, benefits, and protections afforded to
married couples, without actually calling the union a marriage.' As of
September 15, 2000, approximately five hundred couples had entered
civil unions in Vermont.9 As of May 22,2001, that number had grown to
2043 civil unions. ' Over three-quarters of the couples who have taken
advantage of the new law are from out-of-state."
7. STRASSER, supra note 6, at 1. Although Hawaii residents pioneered efforts to
sanction same-sex marriages, Hawaii does not currently recognize same-sex marriage. HAw.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 1999). The debate over the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage made its way to the Hawaii courts in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993),
affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). In Baehr, three same-sex couples had sued John Lewin, the
then Director of the Hawaii Department of Health because they were denied marriage
licenses. Id. at 48. A plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and remanded the case to the trial court. The court placed
the burden on the state "to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is unconstitutional
by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights" under the state constitution. Id. at 68.
Three years later, in Baehr v. Miike, the trial court found that the state had failed to meet its
burden and ordered the state to issue the three couples marriage licenses. Baehr v. Miike,
Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The case went up
again on appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court, but in April 1997, the Hawaii legislature
approved a bill proposing an amendment to the Hawaii Constitution that grants the
legislature power to "reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." Cheryl Wetzstein, Hawaii
Agreement on Same-Sex Unions Won't Work, Foes Say; Marriage Amendment in Jeopardy,
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1997, at A10. On November 3, 1998, Hawaii voters approved the
marriage amendment to the Hawaii Constitution. Lyle Denniston, Voters in Alaska, Hawaii
Defeat Initiatives on Homosexual Marriage; Washington State Quashes Affirmative Action
Effort; Election 1998. Nation, BALT. SUN, Nov. 5, 1998, at 15A. Upon public approval of the
amendment, Hawaii's highest court recognized, "[i]n light of the marriage amendment, HRS
§ 572-1 must be given full force and effect." Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, slip op. (Haw. 1996)
(summary disposition order, rev'd and remanded at Baehr v. Lewin, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw.
1999)).
8. Cheryl Wetzstein, Vermont Governor Signs Bill Legalizing Same-Sex Unions; Foes say
Measure 'Railroaded,' Vow to Continue Fight, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at A3. The
Vermont civil union bill is unprecedented in breadth and possible impact. See Neil Miller,
For Better or For Worse, Vermont Civil Union Legislation Has Been a Boon to Gay Couples-
But Dissenters are Still Pressing Their Case, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2001, Magazine at 13
(quoting state Representative Bill Lippert, who noted: "The phrase 'civil union' didn't exist
before this. We made it up.").
9. Anna Quindlen, Can't People Be Thought of as Ordinary? DES MOINES REG., Sept.
15, 2000, at 15.
10. Miller, supra note 8.
11. Id. (noting that of the 2043 couples who had entered into civil unions in Vermont,
only 430 couples were Vermonters).
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Already we have seen the impact of the Vermont bill as other states
have explored adopting Vermont's model.12 By creating a new legal
option for gay and lesbian couples, the debate has expanded beyond a
simple approval or ban on same-sex marriages.
This Comment discusses the choice of law questions raised by the
Vermont civil union law. It ultimately seeks to answer the question of
whether a court of another state, more specifically Wisconsin, would be
required to recognize a civil union performed in Vermont.'
Using Wisconsin as the forum state, this Comment explores the
hypothetical situation of a couple domiciled in Wisconsin who enters
into a "suitcase"14 civil union in Vermont, and then returns to Wisconsin
seeking full recognition of the rights and benefits provided under
Vermont law to couples united in a civil union.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the Vermont case
and highlights key provisions of the civil union bill. Part IH analyzes our
hypothetical choice of law situation in three main steps. The Comment
first explores state legislative efforts to revise or clarify the definition of
marriage. Second, the Comment examines Wisconsin's statutory choice
of law approach to marriages performed in foreign jurisdictions.
Wisconsin has a marriage evasion statute, s which serves as a
springboard for this analysis, but is arguably not applicable, or simply ill-
fitting to the civil union analysis. Third, because Wisconsin's statutory
choice of law guidelines prove to be unhelpful, this Comment reviews
12. Already, in August 2000, seven states were considering whether to follow Vermont's
footsteps and authorize similar civil union laws. States May Copy Vermont's Civil Union,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Aug. 16,2000, at 826. The seven states were: California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See id.; Eleanor
Yang Civil Union Bill May Open Doors, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 6,2000, at A5.
13. Two states, Illinois and Alabama, issued Attorney General Opinions in 2000 at the
request of members of the state legislature, to answer the question of whether the respective
states would be required to honor Vermont civil unions. See 2000 Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. 129
(April 20,2000) (answering inquiry from State Senator Bobby E. Denton); 2000 Ill. Op. Att'y
Gen. 00-017 (Dec. 29,2000) (answering question from State Senator Edward Petka, Majority
Whip). Both the Illinois Attorney General and the Alabama Attorney General opined that
their states would not be required to honor such unions. Id. As of the writing of this
Comment, Wisconsin had not issued an Attorney General Opinion.
14. The phrase "suitcase marriage" refers to the hypothetical situation in which a couple
marries in a state recognizing same-sex marriages and then returns to their home state
seeking full legal recognition of their rights. Kirk C. Jenkins, RECORDER, Mar. 1, 2000, at 5
(discussing hypothetical same-sex Californian couple). For example, Professor Barbara Cox
extensively discusses a suitcase marriage hypothetical involving a Wisconsin same-sex couple
who marries in Hawaii. Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in
Hawai4 Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033 (1994).
15. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West 1993).
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and applies Wisconsin's choice of law methodology as exemplified in
case law to the hypothetical situation. Part IV of this Comment asks
whether refusing to recognize a Vermont civil union violates the
directives of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. In
addition, this Comment discusses the interplay between the Defense of
Marriage Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Wisconsin presents a particularly interesting case study for several
reasons. Wisconsin is one of few states that has not passed legislation
amending its marriage statutes to expressly prohibit same-sex marriages
or unions. 6 Furthermore, Wisconsin is one of only a handful of states
with a marriage evasion statute currently in force. 7 In addition,
Wisconsin courts have not consistently followed one specific choice of
law theory, resulting in what one commentator has described as a
"melting pot."18
II. OVERVIEW OF VERMONT LAW
A. The Vermont Case: Baker v. State
Baker v. State,'9 which would eventually set the agenda for the
Vermont legislature, began much like the Hawaii Baehr case: three
same-sex couples brought an action against the State of Vermont and
their local governments because, in their respective towns, they were
denied a marriage license by the town clerk.20 The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that the clerks' actions violated the Vermont
marriage laws and the state constitution. 2' The trial court found against
the plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the lower court
erred in its interpretation of Vermont law.'
16. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 5 (providing a lengthy list of states which
have passed statutes explicitly banning same-sex marriages or unions).
17. STRASSER, supra note 6, at 123. Generally, a marriage evasion "statute might
declare that domiciliaries who attempt to evade a statute prohibiting their marriage by going
to another state which recognizes the union will not have their marriage recognized by the
domicile." Id.
18. Shirley A. Wiegand, Officious Intermeddling, Interloping Chauvinism, Restatement
(Second), and Leflar: Wisconsin's Choice of Law Melting Pot, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 761, 761
(1998).
19. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
20. Id. at 867-68.
21. Id. at 868.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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While recognizing that the "plain and ordinary 24 definition of
marriage as the union between husband and wife is "rooted in Vermont
common law,"' the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common
Benefits clause of the Vermont Constitution grants same-sex couples
the "common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under
Vermont law."' The Court relied on the following provision: "That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or
set of persons, who are a part only of that community. "'
Although the Baker court concluded that same sex couples were
entitled to the "common benefits and protections" extended to couples
of the opposite sex, the court fell short of implementing this
constitutional finding.' Instead, the court prescribed the job of
determining the scope and consequence of this constitutional obligation
to the Vermont legislature.29 The court stated, "[w]hatever system is
chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to
afford all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of
the law."3 With this statement, the court laid the groundwork for the
elected officials of the legislature to take action.
B. The Vermont Civil Union Bill
Faced with the agenda handed down by the Vermont Supreme
Court, the Vermont legislature began the process of crafting a bill that
would meet the court's guidelines.3' The efforts of the legislature
culminated on April 25, 2000 when the House and Senate reached
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 867.
27. Id. (quoting VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7). For a discussion of the Baker court's analysis
of the common benefits clause of the Vermont Constitution and the Baker court's treatment
of the federal equal protection guarantees, see, for example, Mark Strasser, Equal Protection
at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935
(2000).
28. Baker, 744 A.2d at 887.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 867.
31. The legislative debates and remarks made by the legislative body were marked by
emotion and energy. See generally Journal of the House, Journalized Remarks of the
Judiciary Committee Report to H. 847 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at
http:llwww.legis.state.vt.us/docsI2000/journallhjOO0426htm [hereinafter Journalized Remarks]
(quoting comments from Representative Thomas Little of Shelburne on Apr. 25, 2000).
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agreement on a civil union bill and passed H. 847.32 The Vermont
governor signed the law on April 26, 2000.33 Most of the legislation,
entitled "An Act Relating to Civil Unions," became effective on July 1,
2000, while others, such as the insurance provisions, became effective
January 1, 2001. 4
When the Vermont legislature passed the civil union bill, it did not
legitimize same-sex marriage;35 technically, a civil union is not the same
as a marriage under Vermont law. Due to political pressure and intense
lobbying, the legislature felt compelled to explicitly articulate
Vermont's definition of a civil marriage as the "union between a man
and a woman.31
To form a civil union, the parties must "[b]e of the same sex and
therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state. "18 To qualify as
a party to a civil union, a person may "[n]ot be a party to another civil
union or marriage, 39 and the other party to the civil union must not be a
close relative.'
Although a civil union is technically distinct from a civil marriage,
benefits granted to parties in a civil union parallel those benefits
currently enjoyed by married couples. 1 The statute identifies the
benefits and protections afforded to parties that enter in a civil union:
(a) Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits,
32. Ross Sneyd, Gay Union Measure Gets Legislative OK, Vermont Governor Promises
He Will Sign Landmark Bill into Law, TIMES UNION, Apr. 26,2000, at Al.
33. World and National Report: Vermont Gov Inks Gay Civil Union Law, NEW YORK
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 27, 2000, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/2000-04-
27/News_andViews/Beyondjthecity/a-64722.asp. Upon signing the civil union bill,
Vermont Governor Howard Dean was quoted as saying, "This is a statement that Vermont
values people for who they are, not what they are." Id.
34. H. 847, sec. 42 (enacted as Act 91, titled "An Act Relating to Civil Unions").
35. Currently, no state recognizes same-sex marriages and most states explicitly prohibit
them. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 5.
36. See, e.g., Journalized Remarks, supra note 31.
37. The first legislative finding of H. 847 states: "Civil marriage under Vermont's
marriage statutes consists of a union between a man and a woman. This interpretation of the
state's marriage laws was upheld by the Supreme Court in Baker v. State." H. 847, sec.1. The
House version of the bill did not initially have this as its first finding, but upon
recommendation of the Senate, the House Committee on the Judiciary urged the House to
give this definition forefront status. See Journalized Remarks, supra note 31.
38. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202(2) (Supp. 2000).
39. Id. § 1202(1).
40. Id. § 1203.
41. Id. § 1204(a).
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protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or
any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
marriage. (b) A party to a civil union shall be included in any
definition or use of the terms "spouse," "family," "immediate
family," "dependent," "next of kin," and other terms that denote
the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the
law. (c) Parties to a civil union shall be responsible for the
support of one another to the same degree and in the same
manner as prescribed under law for married persons. (d) The law
of domestic relations, including annulment, separation and
divorce, child custody and support, and property division and
maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union.'
The Act also provides a "nonexclusive list of legal benefits,
protections and responsibilities of spouses, which shall apply in like
manner to parties to a civil union."'  The twenty-four benefits,
responsibilities, and protections specifically mentioned include: property
rights, family leave benefits, damages for actions based on spousal status
(e.g., loss of consortium), adoption rights, spousal abuse programs, and
homestead property tax allowance. 44
The Vermont Civil Union Review Commission has been charged to
"[c]ollect information about the recognition and treatment of Vermont
civil unions by other states and jurisdictions, including procedures for
dissolution." 46 The Commission issued its first report in January of 2001,
in which it summarized its work and findings related to this directive
thus far.' The Commission's preliminary efforts have included posting a
request-for-information announcement in the November 2000 issue of
the Vermont Bar News, and submitting a similar announcement to the
American Bar Association Newsletter and to the National Association
of Bar Executives Journal for publication.' In addition, the
Commission has been in touch with legislative council staff in all fifty
states, urging them to contact the Vermont Legislative Council
42. Id. § 1204(a)-(d).
43. Id. § 1204(e).
44. Id.
45. The Vermont Civil Union Review Commission was established by Sec. 40 of 1999
Act 91 (H.847).
46. Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review Commission (Legislative Council,
Montpelier, VT), Jan. 2001, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/cureport.htm.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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concerning any relevant legislative proposals and ballot initiatives in
their states.49
III. CoNFLIcr OF LAWS
Because the rights granted to couples united in a civil union are so
extensive, it is possible that non-Vermont residents who enter into a
civil union will ask their home state to recognize such a union. In fact,
many couples who went to Vermont in the first few weeks following the
enactment of the civil union bill to be joined in a civil union were non-
Vermont residents.! Several of these couples were already anticipating
a tough legal battle to get their licenses recognized in their home states."
Assume, for purposes of this Comment, that one of these couples
who traveled to Vermont to enter into a civil union was from Wisconsin.
They return shortly to Wisconsin and are denied one of the rights
reserved exclusively for spouses in Wisconsin. They sue in state court,
claiming that Wisconsin should recognize their union and grant them the
same rights as a married couple. What effect should a Wisconsin court
give the Vermont civil union?
In addressing the hypothetical of our Wisconsin couple who travels
to Vermont, two questions need to be examined: Wisconsin choice of
law theory-as exemplified by statutory and case law-and federal
action under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and its interplay with the
Defense of Marriage Act. Let us begin with the first question.
A. Legislative Trends
As we have seen, the Vermont civil union bill grants same-sex
couples virtually the same rights and benefits as married couples,
without actually calling the relationship marriage." The situation of our
hypothetical couple has not yet been litigated in Wisconsin. Therefore,
the best guidance may be to simply analogize what Wisconsin would do
if the Vermont couple was actually married, noting any possible
distinctions that might affect the outcome because the civilly united
couple is not technically married.
49. Id.
50. See Carey Goldberg, Gay Couples Flocking to Vermont: Influx by Out-Of-Staters is
Civil Union's Law's Most Striking Immediate Effect, PIrSBURGH PoST-GAzETTE, July 25,
2000, at A4 (describing New York couple who wishes to have civil union recognized in home
state).
51. Id.
52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (Supp. 2000).
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Under traditional choice of law doctrine, typically a marriage
entered into in State X is valid elsewhere, as long as it is valid under the
law of State X.' However, public policy considerations of the state in
which recognition of the marriage is being sought may result in the
converse result.' Or, in an attempt to provide its courts with guidance, a
state may have adopted a marriage evasion statute.5
Since 1995, with the advent of the Defense of Marriage Act56 as well
as the developments in Hawaiif and Alaska," the majority of states have
revised their marriage statutes to either explicitly prohibit same-sex
marriage or specifically define marriage as the union between a man and
woman, or male and female. 9 One could argue that because Vermont's
civil unions are essentially marriages for all practical purposes, these
marriage statutes, modeled after the federal DOMA, can also be
understood to encompass and apply to civil unions.
With the advent of the Vermont civil union law in November 2000,
Nevada and Nebraska approved ballot initiatives "prohibiting
recognition of same-sex relationships. ' Nebraska's efforts go one step
further to explicitly include the prohibition of civil unions, not just same-
sex marriages, by amending the constitution to state that "only
marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in
Nebraska and to provide further that the uniting of two persons of the
same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership or other similar
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."6'1 Nevada's
efforts, which must be approved by voters in 2002, are similar to other
measures taken by the majority of states, which define marriage as the
53. SCOLES, supra note 3, § 13.5, at 548.
54. kl § 13.5, at 550.
55. Wisconsin is one of only five states which initially enacted a marriage evasion statute
modeled after the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, before it was replaced with the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. In addition to Wisconsin, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
Vermont had adopted the earlier version of the uniform act. See SCOLES, supra note 3, §
13.13, at 564 & nn.1-2.
56. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-199,110 Stat. 2419 (codified in sections
one and twenty-eight of the United States Code).
57. As the nation's attention was drawn to the events in Hawaii, in early 1996, twenty-
four states introduced marriage recognition bills defining marriage as a female-male union or
explicitly prohibiting same-sex marriage. See Coolidge and Duncan, supra note 5, at 7 & n.29.
58. See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage AmendmenL" The People's Choice
on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213 (1999) (discussing recent developments in
Alaska, specifically the marriage amendment to the state's constitution).
59. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 5.
60. Report of the Vermont Civil Union Review Commission, supra note 46.
61. Id.
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union of a man and a woman. 2
Wisconsin has not followed suit and legislative efforts to revise the
marriage statute have failed. Unlike the majority of states,' Wisconsin
law does not specifically prohibit same-sex marriage nor make explicit
reference to marriage as the union between man and woman, or male
and female.6 However, the Wisconsin statutes state, "Under the laws of
this state, marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a
husband and a wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and
support. " "  Furthermore, the Wisconsin statutes currently define
marriage as "a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable
in law of contracting is essential, and which creates the legal status of
husband and wife. "66
Wisconsin law does not permit marriage between: 1) parties which
already have a living husband or wife, or 2) parties who are "nearer of
kin than 2nd cousins." '67 No specific mention is made of same-sex
marriages or of civil unions. The reasons why these types of marriages
are prohibited likely include the state's desire to promote stability
among families, prevent genetic defects, and preserve the family unit.
Arguably, none of these reasons, which seek to further the stated goals
of Wisconsin's Family Code, apply to civil unions.'
Thus, one could argue that although the statute uses the terms
"husband" and "wife," this does not automatically mean that any other
type of marriage is prohibited. Apparently following the national
trend,69 some members of the legislature were sufficiently concerned
62. Id.
63. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 5.
64. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 (West 1993).
65. Id. § 765.001.
66. Id. § 765.01.
67. Id. § 765.03.
68. The Wisconsin Statutes state:
It is the intent of [Wisconsin's Family Code] to promote the stability and best
interests of marriage and the family. It is the intent of the legislature to recognize
the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at termination of
the marriage by dissolution or death. Marriage is the institution that is the
foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and
civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state.
Id. § 765.001.
69. One commentator suggests that many legislatures have felt compelled, "[o]nce
convinced they have no choice," to take on the task of answering the "definitional question
with a definitional answer: marriage is a male-female community; marriage is not anything
else." Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 5, at 14-15.
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about this possibility, that they proposed bills which would have
amended Wisconsin's current definition of marriage.' The two bills
proposed during the 1999-2000 legislative session were 1999 Assembly
Bill 781 and 1999 Senate Bill 401. They were proposed to amend the
statute in order to explicitly state that the Wisconsin legislature intended
marriage to be defined only as the union "between one man and one
woman."
71
The proposed assembly and senate versions are virtually identical
and would have amended section 765.01 to state that marriage "is a civil
contract between one man and one woman, to which the consent of the
parties capable in law of contracting is essential, and which creates the
legal status of husband and wife. "72 Furthermore, the bills addressed the
situation in which a same-sex couple goes to another state to get married
and then returns to Wisconsin seeking recognition of their marriage.
The proposed language would have created section 765.01(2) to read:
"Regardless of whether s. 765.04 applies and regardless of whether a
marriage takes place in another jurisdiction in which marriage other
than between one man and one woman is defined as valid, only
marriage between one man and one woman shall be recognized as valid
in this state. "73
B. Wisconsin and Same-Sex Marriage
Unlike other states, the Wisconsin courts have also been relatively
silent on the issue of same-sex marriages. The court was presented with
the opportunity to address the issue of same-sex marriage in Burkett v.
Zablocki, in which two females sued the Milwaukee County Clerk.74
The women sought "an order compelling the clerk of Milwaukee
County to issue them an application for a marriage license."7' The clerk
moved to dismiss, and the plaintiffs failed to submit timely briefs in
response to the clerk's motion. Faced with no other viable option, the
court dismissed the case.' The only hint of the court's inclination is
found in dicta, in which the court suggests that two possible sources of
70. Wis. Assemb. B. 781 (1999); Wis. S. B. 401 (1999).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626,626 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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guidance78 may be found in McConnell v. Anderson9 and Baker v.
Nelson o from our neighboring jurisdiction.
Dicta in two Wisconsin cases have stated that "Wisconsin does not
recognize same-sex marriages. 8 1 In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel
Commission," a female filed an employment discrimination complaint
against the Department of Health and Social Services because she was
not allowed to include her lesbian companion in her insurance
coverage." In a footnote, the court noted that the plaintiff based her
arguments "on the fact that Wisconsin does not recognize same-sex
marriages. "8 In re Angel Lace M. involved a child adoption dispute, in
which a party sought to adopt the child of her former partner with
whom she had previously entered into a "marriage-like ceremony. '
Citing to Phillips and to section 765.001(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes,
the court stated in a footnote that Wisconsin "does not recognize same-
sex marriages."8 6 However, neither case states that Wisconsin explicitly
prohibits marriages between parties of the same gender.
Even if the Wisconsin judicial branch had fully addressed the issue
beyond dicta in a footnote, it is not clear that a Wisconsin court would
have recognized same-sex marriages by virtue of the fact that the
marriage statute is silent with regard to same-sex marriages. The
Minnesota court in Baker v. Nelson" did not find this argument
convincing.' The facts in Baker are similar to the situation in Burkett.
In Baker, two males sought an order compelling the Hennepin County
clerk to issue them a marriage license, and in Burkett, two females
sought an order compelling the Milwaukee County Clerk to issue a
marriage application.' The plaintiffs argued that the Minnesota
marriage statute in effect at that time" did not contain an "express
78. Id.
79. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
80. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
81. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680 n.1 (Wis. 1994).
82. 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 123.
84. Id. at 123 n.1.
85. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 680.
86. Id. at 680 n.1.
87. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
88. Id. at 185-86.
189. Id. at 185; Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
90. The Minnesota marriage statute in question has since been revised to read:
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statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages [which] evince[d] a
legislative intent to authorize such marriages."91 The court noted that it
would have been "unrealistic" to believe that such an interpretation of
the marriage statute would be faithful to the intent of the original
drafters of the statute; marriage was intended to mean the union of a
female and a male only.' Making reference to the book of Genesis and
Black's Law Dictionary, the court held that the statute was
constitutional and did not require the clerk to issue a marriage license.'
A similar argument was advanced by the plaintiffs with nearly
identical facts in Singer v. Hara.4  In Singer, two Washington men
argued that the county auditor's refusal to grant them a marriage license
impinged upon their constitutional right.95 The plaintiffs contended that
Washington's statute96 only required that parties entering a marriage
have attained age eighteen and be capable of entering marriage, but not
that the parties be of different genders. 7  The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument, stating that other provisions of the marriage
statutes refer to "the male" and "the female," which indicated that the
legislature intended for marriage to exist only between two persons of
different genders.93 Just as the Baker court had ruled in Minnesota, the
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract between a man
and a woman, to which the consent of the parties, capable in law of contracting, is
essential. Lawful marriage may be contracted only between persons of the opposite
sex and only when a license has been obtained as provided by law and when the
marriage is contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solemnized by one
authorized, or whom one or both of the parties in good faith believe to be
authorized, so to do. Marriages subsequent to April 26, 1941, not so contracted shall
be null and void.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
91. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
92. Idi at 186.
93. Id. at 186 & n.1.
94. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
95. Id. at 1188.
96. The statute in effect at the time the plaintiffs applied for a marriage license, stated:
Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of
eighteen years, who are otherwise capable: Provided, That every marriage entered
into in which either party shall not have attained the age of seventeen years shall be
void except where this section has been waived by a superior court judge of the
county in which the female resides on a showing of necessity.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1970) (repealed 1973) (printed in Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189
n.2).
97. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189.
98. Id.
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Singer court held that neither the state statute nor the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that the court rule in
favor of the result desired by the plaintiffs.99 In short, the court noted
that it would not engage in judicial legislating; it is within the
legislature's constitutional power to alter the definition of marriage."
Following the decisions of Baker and Singer, both the Washington
and Minnesota lawmakers have amended their statutes to explicitly
prohibit same-sex marriages. '  However, as we have seen, the
Wisconsin legislature has chosen not to amend the state's marriage
statutes. In other words, if the Wisconsin legislature truly wanted to
make clear that same-sex marriage was not prohibited, one could argue
that it would have passed legislation like so many of the other states, to
ensure that the legislative intent of the marriage statutes is honored.
C. Statutory Choice of Law: Wisconsin's Marriage Evasion Statute
Because choice of law cases are often complex, legislatures
sometimes enact laws addressing special situations, instead of relying on
the courts.' ° The Wisconsin legislature enacted a marriage evasion
statute to address a situation in which a couple left the state solely for
the purpose of evading Wisconsin restrictions." A strong argument can
be made that because a civil union is virtually identical to marriage, a
Wisconsin court could look to Wisconsin's marriage evasion statute for
guidance and treat the civil union like a same-sex marriage.
Section 765.04 of the Wisconsin Family Code provides that if a
person who is prohibited from marrying in Wisconsin leaves the state
and goes to another state in order to evade the restrictions imposed by
Wisconsin on marriage, and returns to Wisconsin seeking recognition of
that marriage, Wisconsin will not recognize that marriage and will deem
it void. 4 Stated affirmatively, Wisconsin will recognize a marriage if it
is valid where it is made, as long as it is not prohibited in Wisconsin.
For example, in In re Canon's Estate,05 a Wisconsin couple traveled
99. Id. at 1197.
100. Id.
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
517.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
102. "One possible solution to the choice of law quagmire is legislation." ROGER C.
CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLIcT OF LAWS 90 (5th ed. 1993).
103. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West 1993).
104. Id.
105. 266 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1936).
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to Illinois in order to get married.'O Wisconsin law at the time
prohibited an epileptic from contracting marriage, and the couple
sought recognition of their marriage in Wisconsin." Invoking the
marriage evasion statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to
validate their marriage."
Thus, if same-sex marriage was explicitly prohibited in Wisconsin,
the marriage evasion statute would govern and find the couple's
marriage void. Given the fact that Wisconsin has not approved a
marriage recognition statute stating that same-sex marriage is
specifically prohibited, the marriage evasion statute may not be helpful
and may even be irrelevant if a Wisconsin court faced this issue today.
Thus, if a Wisconsin court were faced with our hypothetical couple, it
would likely turn to Wisconsin's choice-of-law principles.
D. Wisconsin's Choice of Law Theory as Applied by Courts
As one commentator notes, "Choice of law arbitrates values. When
a court chooses one state's law over another's, it is not only determining
the rule of the decision, it is deciding which state's values it should
adopt."19
Choice of law theories and principles are numerous; they include
traditional theory, the First Restatement, the Second Restatement, and
Leflar's Rule, or a combination of some or all."" In addition, courts
often resort to escape devices to achieve their desired result. The most
notable device, and the one warranting our attention, is the public policy
exception, which offers courts a mechanism to justify an outcome based
on the state's public policy.'
For our purposes, two of these analyses are of most concern to us:
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws and Leflar's choice-
influencing factors. The Second Restatement proposes a number of
factors to guide a court in its analysis for determining which state has
the most appropriate law, in the absence of a clear "statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law."m These factors are:
106. Id. at 918-19.
107. Id. at 919.
108. Id. at 920.
109. Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799,799-
800 (1999).
110. See generally SCOLES, supra note 3.
111. See generally Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy
Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45 (1998).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the
relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of
justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity
of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.113
In addition, for contracts, a court can consider specific "contacts,"
such as: "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the
contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties. ",
1 4
Leflar's methodology proposes that a court consider five elements in
its conflicts of law approach: "A. Predictability of Results; B.
Maintenance of Interstate and International Order; C. Simplification of
the Judicial Task; D. Advancement of the Forum's Governmental
Interests; and E. Application of the Better Rule of Law."" 5
Wisconsin's approach to choice-of-law issues has been described as a
"melting pot" and one that cannot be easily classified into a neat
category."6 From 1904 to the mid-1960s, Wisconsin's highest court
observed traditional conflict of laws methodology. 7 In 1965, in Wilcox
v. Wilcox,"' the Wisconsin Supreme Court abandoned its traditional
choice of law approach and applied a new standard. This new standard
non-uniformly combined bits and pieces of various choice-of-law
principles, including the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis, and Albert A.
Ehrenzweig's presumptive forum law principles."9
In its next significant case, Heath v. Zellmer" the supreme court
later adopted Robert A. Leflar's considerations, seemingly ignoring the
113. Id. § 6(2).
114. Id. § 188(2).
115. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts of Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1586-87 (1966).
116. Wiegand, supra note 18, at 761.
117. Id. at 772.
118. 133 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1965).
119. Wiegand, supra note 18, at 773-76.
120. 151 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1967).
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analysis it had adopted just two years earlier.12' Following Wilcox and
Zellmer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struggled to articulate a uniform
standard to follow when faced with a conflict-of-law situation, vacillating
between various approaches and unpredictably modifying the
standard." Probably due to unclear guidance from the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, lower courts and federal courts sitting in diversity
applying Wisconsin law have also failed to develop and apply a uniform
conflict of law standard.13
Because Wisconsin courts have treated Wisconsin choice-of-law
issues somewhat erratically, it would be difficult to chart the course a
Wisconsin court might take."' However, Leflar's methodology merits
our consideration due to its practicality and relatively widespread use,
albeit inconsistently, in Wisconsin courts.' In addition, since Wisconsin
courts have indicated a willingness to accept section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, and have made numerous references
to the Restatement, this analysis also merits some attention.
1. Leflar's Better Rule
Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co."" probably represents Wisconsin's
best application of Leflar's choice of law considerations. 7 In Hunker,
two Ohio employees rented a vehicle in Illinois and, while in Wisconsin,
collided with another vehicle, driven by a Wisconsin resident." One of
the employees, who was a passenger in the vehicle, was injured and sued
the Ohio insurance company that had issued a car insurance policy to
the driver co-worker." The injured employee also sued another insurer,
a foreign company doing business in Wisconsin, which had issued
coverage for the rental vehicle' 3° Upon his return to Ohio, the plaintiff
121. Wiegand, supra note 18, at 776-81.
122- Id. at 781-89.
123. See id. at 798-807 (discussing numerous lower court and federal court decisions
applying diverse methodology).
124. See id. at 807-14 (urging the Wisconsin courts to take a "workable" approach
towards their choice of law methodology).
125. See id. at 813 (urging Wisconsin courts to "return to Leflar analysis, re-learn its
principles, focus on its choice-influencing considerations-all of them-and eliminate
references to Restatement (Second), significant contacts, and forum preference").
126. 204 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1973).
127. Wiegand, supra note 18, at 814 (noting Professor Leflar's observation that Hunker
is a "good example of his analysis.").
128. Hunker, 204 N.W.2d at 898.
129. Id. at 898-99.
130. Id. at 899.
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received a worker's compensation award.131 The insurers then moved to
dismiss, urging the court to apply Ohio law, which would prevent the
plaintiff from recovering from the co-worker or his insurer.'32
Given the conflict-of-law situation, the court noted that it was
compelled to apply the choice-influencing considerations. If that
determination did not point toward an application of foreign law, then
the law of the forum, Wisconsin, would govern."
In applying Leflar's first criterion, "[p]redictability of results," the
court noted it was "reasonable to assume that the parties... expected
that Ohio law" would govern the insurance transaction and that the
"legal consequences of an accident... would be determined by Ohiolaw. "3
The court observed that the second consideration, "maintenance of
interstate and international order," "require[d] that a state that is
minimally concerned defer to the interests of a state that is substantially
concerned.' 35 The court weighed Wisconsin's interest against Ohio's
interest.'36 The court found that although the accident took place in
Wisconsin, Wisconsin did not have a likely concern. 37 In contrast,
Ohio's concerns were more consequential, given the fact that the two
workers were Ohio residents working for an Ohio employer."~
In examining Leflar's third factor, "simplification of the judicial
task,"'39 the court found that it did not have bearing on the situation at
hand." It was just as easy for the Wisconsin judge to apply Ohio law as
it would be to apply Wisconsin law.141
Moving on to the next choice-influencing consideration, the forum's
"governmental interests,"'42 the court considered Wisconsin's tort
jurisprudence, which does not limit recovery in a suit against a
coworker. 43 However, the court concluded that Wisconsin had no
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 903.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 903-04 (quoting Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579,584 (1968)).
136. Id. at 903-04.
137. Id. at 904.
138. Id.
139. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1586.
140. Hunker, 204 N.W.2d at 904.
141. Id.
142. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1586.
143. Hunker, 204 N.W.2d at 904-06.
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"identifiable or serious governmental interest in having an Ohio
resident recover more than the expressed policy of that state permits." '"
The court gave the most consideration to the last factor, the "better
law" factor.45 Commenting that Ohio's law is not a "vestige of a 'creed
outworn"1 46 but rather represents the trend among numerous states,'47
the court found Ohio law to be the "better law. "'48 The court held that
149Ohio law applied to the case.
In our hypothetical situation of a Wisconsin couple traveling to
Vermont and shortly returning thereafter to Wisconsin, Leflar's .first
consideration, "predictability of results","5 does not weigh in too
strongly one way or the other. However, our couple could argue that
their 'expectations ' was that Wisconsin would recognize their union.
Given the fact that this would be a case of first impression for a
Wisconsin court, however, it is difficult to imagine that a Wisconsin
court might be swayed by that argument because the couple would have
little guidance in advance of what law governed their transaction.
Likewise, Leflar's second consideration, "maintenance of interstate
and international order"' 2 is not wholly decisive in our case, yet seems
to indicate that Wisconsin law should apply. This factor admonishes
that "[n]o forum whose concern with a set of facts is negligible should
claim priority for its law over the law of a state which has a clearly
superior concern with the facts. "" At face value, it appears that
because the couple is domiciled in Wisconsin, and wants Wisconsin to
recognize the protections afforded to them in marriage, Wisconsin has a
greater interest than Vermont. On the other hand, Vermont permits
out-of-staters to enter civil unions, and one would imagine that Vermont
also expected many couples from out of state to flock to Vermont
seeking a civil union license. Furthermore, one could argue that
recognition of a Vermont civil union by other states will be inevitable in
the future. Is a couple who enters into a civil union forever trapped in
144. Id. at 906.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 907.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 908.
150. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1586.
151. The court in Hunker noted that the parties "predictions and expectations" are
important considerations. 204 N.W.2d at 903.
152. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1586.
153. Id.
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Vermont if they want to enjoy the benefits of their license? One could
imagine a couple living in Vermont for ten years, and then deciding to
move to Wisconsin. Is the ten-year period of residence so influential as
to warrant recognition of this union, but not of a "suitcase civil union."
Just as in Hunker, Leflar's third consideration, "simplification of the
judicial task,"'' " does not seem to matter much in our case. It would not
be any simpler for the Wisconsin court to apply Vermont law than to
apply Wisconsin law.
Leflar's last two choice-influencing considerations, "advancement of
the forum's governmental interests"155 and "application of the better rule
of law,"'6 are perhaps the most significant in our analysis. Wisconsin's
interests in the hypothetical case are rather substantial because the
couple is domiciled in Wisconsin.57 But just what are Wisconsin's
interests? While Wisconsin has numerous laws protecting
discrimination because of sexual orientation, the highest court in the
state has "not been as receptive to recognizing the rights of gay men and
lesbians."'58 But the Wisconsin court may be showing signs of change, at
least when it comes to visitation rights in cases involving non-traditional
marriage-like unions. In 1995, in a case involving two women in a
"close, committed relationship," the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized that "public policy considerations do not prohibit a court
from relying on its equitable powers to grant visitation ... on the basis
of a co-parenting agreement between a biological parent and another
when visitation is in the child's best interest."159
The last consideration, the "better rule law,"'' offers perhaps the
best argument for advocates of recognition of a same-sex union entered
into in Vermont. As one commentator notes, in the case of same-sex
marriage, "[A]dvocates could argue that state laws which do not
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1587.
156. Id.
157. One commentator notes that a state may have both direct and indirect interests in
the marital status of its residents. Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the
Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 6-8 (2000). An indirect interest
might be aiding citizens comply with obligations or obtain appropriate redress; a direct
interest involves state's interest in "having people act one way rather than another." Id. at 7.
158. Cox, supra note 14, at 1180-81 n.275.
159. In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (1995). The 1995 decision effectively
overruled an earlier decision in which the Wisconsin court had refused to grant a lesbian co-
parent custodial or visitation rights in a case involving her former partner's biological child.
See Cox, supra note 14, at 1181 n.275 (citing In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991)).
160. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1587.
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recognize same-sex marriage are 'archaic and unfair.' Same-sex couples
are the only adults, other than those who violate some additional
statutory proscription, who are not freely permitted to marry the
partner of their choice." ' Likewise, an attorney representing our
hypothetical Wisconsin couple, could argue that Vermont's civil union
law is a step in the right direction toward recognition of committed,
same-sex relationships.
Furthermore, as one commentator points out, "[t]he Wisconsin
legislature has not simply evinced a passive attitude toward sexual
minorities living in Wisconsin. It has taken significant steps to prevent
harmful differences in treatment. "62 For example, section
939.645(1)(b), Wisconsin's hate crime law, increases penalties for crimes
committed against a person based "in whole or in part because of the
actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person .... , 63
In addition, efforts to define marriage only as the union between one
man and one woman have failed in the legislature, which may be
evidence that legislators are unwilling to block support for same-sex
unions, or at the very least open to the possibility of recognizing such
unions in the future.'6 However, section 944.01 of the Wisconsin
statutes also makes it clear that "[a]lthough the state does not regulate
the private sexual activity of consenting adults, the state does not
condone or encourage any form of sexual conduct outside the ingtitution
of marriage."' ' Thus, in order to succeed in this argument, our couple
would need to convince the court that a civil union is practically and
realistically synonymous with marriage.
Another argument for our couple's attorney would be to draw
parallels between anti-miscegenation statutes and laws prohibiting
same-sex marriages." Clearly, the argument goes, just as bans on
interracial marriage "promoted feelings of inferiority and second-class
citizenship,"1 67 failure to recognize same-sex marriages is outdated and
discriminatory. Slightly modified for our purposes, an attorney could
argue that Wisconsin's failure to recognize the civil union would be
161. Cox, supra note 14, at 1109.
162. Id. at 1080 n.273.
163. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (b)(1) (West 1996).
164. Wis. Assemb. B. 781 (1999); Wis. S. B. 401 (1999).
165. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.01 (West 1996).
166. Cox, supra note 14, at 1110-11.
167. Id. at 1116.
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irrational and archaic.
2. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law
Since Wisconsin courts have indicated a willingness to accept section
187 of the Second Restatement6 and have made numerous references
to the Second Restatement, a Wisconsin court may look to these rules
for guidance.169
Not surprisingly, an analysis under the Second Restatement does not
yield conclusory, bright-line results. Given the fact that a civil union is a
new alternative, the Second Restatement does not offer direct guidance
for a court. The Second Restatement does not specifically treat civil
unions for the simple reason that they were not in existence prior to the
promulgation of the rules. Despite the Second Restatement's limited
guidance, two possibilities exist to analyze the civil union hypothetical:
first, by analogizing to marriage, and second, by treating it is a contract.
At the very least, the analysis reveals the extent of the legal jumble
courts will face; at the very most, it provides loose guidance as to a
court's possible course.
Clearly, a civil union is not a marriage, yet it confers upon a couple
virtually the same legal benefits and rights as a married couple.70
Section 283(1) of the Second Restatement urges courts to consider the
"local law of the state which... has the most significant relationship to
the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6."17'
Section six delineates a list of factors the court should consider:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the
relevant policies of the forum; (c) relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of
justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity
of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.'7
In addition, section 283(2) provides that a "marriage which satisfies
168. Section 187 addresses party autonomy in contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
169. See Wiegand, supra note 18, at 1814.
170. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1203 (Supp. 2000).
171. RESTATEMENT § 283(1).
172. Id. § 6(2).
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the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. "17 The approach
suggested by the Second Restatement clearly favors recognition of a
marriage entered into outside a state's borders.'
In the case of our hypothetical couple, the analysis seems
straightforward, even without a detailed evaluation of the section six
factors. The couple is domiciled in Wisconsin, has strong ties to
Wisconsin, and the couple's only contact with Vermont occurred for the
sole purpose of entering the union. Wisconsin is the state with the
"most significant relationship."'1 75  Thus, in substituting the word
"marriage" with "civil union," the essential question becomes whether
the recognition of the couple's union would violate Wisconsin's public
policy and whether Wisconsin has a "sufficiently strong policy.., to
warrant invalidation of the [union]." 176
Just because Wisconsin does not have a statute recognizing civil
unions does not mean that a Wisconsin court automatically would refuse
to recognize a Vermont civil union based on a public policy exception."
As a New York court noted in deciding which law to apply in a tort
action, "[i]f aid is to be withheld... it must be because the cause of
action in its nature offends our sense of justice or menaces the public
welfare., 178 Thus, an advocate for our hypothetical couple would argue
that the absence of a civil union statute is not decisive in defining
Wisconsin's view of same-sex marriages.
Wisconsin's various legislation protecting gay and lesbian individuals
would seem to indicate that Wisconsin's public policy favors protection
173. Id. § 283(2).
174. The introductory comment of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in
chapter 11 states: "A person's status remains the same during his travels from state to state.
So persons who have been validly married will be regarded as husband and wife as they move
from state to state."
175. Id. § 283(1).
176. Id. § 283 cmt k.
177. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E.2d 198, 201(N.Y. 1918) (describing the
public policy exception and stating in reference to a foreign statute: "Our own scheme of
legislation may be different. We may even have no legislation on the subject. That is not
enough to show that public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign right .... If a foreign
statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing
to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him.").
178. Id. at 201.
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for such individuals.79 In exploring whether states would recognize a
Hawaii same-sex marriage, Barbara Cox noted that a couple may
actually fare better in Wisconsin that in other states because of
Wisconsin's favorable laws toward gays and lesbians."' Current
Wisconsin statutes specifically provide anti-discriminatory protections
for gays and lesbians in various areas, such as in state employment. 8'
An alternative option under the Second Restatement would be to treat
the civil union like a contract between two parties. The shortcomings of
this alternative, however, are obvious with just a cursory review of the
factors the court is urged to consider. Section 188, which governs
contracts, proposes that in evaluating the contacts with a particular
state, a court should consider: "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place
of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the
location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties.""'
This analysis should be done in light of the factors listed in section
six of the Restatement.' This section also contains a presumptive rule
which instructs the court that if the place of negotiation of the contract
and the place of performance of the contract coincide in the same state,
the court should apply that state's law.' Clearly this list of contacts was
not written with civil unions in mind, and is not intended to apply to
marriages since section 283 is reserved exclusively for analysis of
marriage contracts. While the parties entered into the contract in
Vermont, they are domiciled in Wisconsin. Determining where a civil
union was negotiated or determining the "location of the subject
matter"8's of a civil union seems absurd because the factors were clearly
not written with this type of contract in mind. One would be hard-
pressed to imagine a Wisconsin court analyzing our hypothetical
situation under section 188 by taking each factor one by one and
evaluating them in light of section six.
However, the factors delineated in section six could help the court or
179. Cox, supra note 14, at 1080 & n.273.
180. Id. at 1080. Wisconsin was a pioneer in promulgating laws explicitly protecting gays
and lesbians against discriminatory practices. Id.
181. Id. at 1080 & n.273 (citing numerous Wisconsin statutes including section 230.01(2)
which addresses state employment).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 188(3).
185. Id. § 188(2).
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the couple reach or justify a desired outcome. The couple could argue
that the first factor, "the needs of the interstate and international
systems," 6 would suggest that recognition of a Vermont civil union
facilitates mobility among states. Otherwise, a couple entering into a
Vermont civil union would be forced to always stay in Vermont if they
wanted the protection and recognition of the rights afforded by
Vermont law. One could imagine the situation of a couple who lived in
Vermont for years who upon being forced to move to another state, has
to see all their benefits and rights disappear into thin air. The counter-
argument is simple, yet strong: the Vermont legislature has no right to
meddle and impose its view on other states.
The second and third factors reflect an effort to urge the court to
consider each state's public policies. A comment to the second factor,
"the relevant policies of the forum,"'197 urges the court to recognize that
"[e]very rule of law, whether embodied in a statute or in a common law
rule, was designed to achieve one or more purposes. A court should
have regard for these purposes in determining whether to apply its own
rule or the rule of another state .... " "' The third factor, "the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue," '189 reminds the court
to evaluate the competing interests of each state.
The analysis under these factors is similar to the public policy
exception discussed earlier under the section 283 rules addressing
marriage."9' Wisconsin does not specifically prohibit same-sex unions
nor does it explicitly permit it. An examination of Wisconsin's statutory
law suggests, however, that Wisconsin seeks to protect and advance the
interests of its gay and lesbian population. 9' As evidenced by the
passage of their civil union bill, Vermont strongly favors the
advancement of the interest of gays and lesbians to the extent that it
created the civil union relationship, which elevates a committed
relationship between two same sex individuals to nearly the same level
as marriage."
The Wisconsin couple would be hard-pressed to argue that a
186. Id. § 6(2)(a).
187. Id. § 6(2)(b).
188. Id. § 6 cmt. e.
189. Id. § 6(2)(c).
190. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1203 (Supp. 2000).
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recognition of their civil union would advance "protection of [their]
justified expectations,"'3 the fourth factor. Given that this is a case of
first impression and given the controversial nature of the Vermont law,
the couple may find it difficult to convince the court that they expected
only Vermont law to apply. On the other hand, the couple could
suggest that just like most individuals expect a valid marriage entered
into in Vermont to be recognized in Wisconsin, they too expected that
their valid Vermont civil union would be honored in Wisconsin. Again,
the argument here is weak.
The fourth factor concerning the "basic policies underlying the
particular field of law," 94 would probably not receive much weight. One
would imagine that parties typically enter marriages or civil unions
freely and are not under duress.
The comments explaining the fifth factor, "certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result"'95 suggest that these concerns are most relevant
when there is evidence that the parties "are likely to give advance
thought to the legal consequences of their transactions."''  The
Wisconsin couple most likely entered the Vermont civil union, in
addition to emotional reasons, to gain the legal protections conferred to
couples who enter such unions. However, given the still strong moral
and political resistance to same-sex unions, it would be difficult for the
couple to argue that they predicted or expected the court to fully
embrace their union and extend them all benefits conferred under
Vermont law.
The analysis for the final factor for consideration, "ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied,"' 7 closely
resembles Leflar's "simplification of the judicial task"' 9 consideration.
A Wisconsin court could just as easily apply either Vermont or
Wisconsin law, although arguably Vermont law is fairly novel and
unchartered, which could present a problem for a Wisconsin court.
Overall, under the Second Restatement it would appear that a
Wisconsin court would be inclined to not recognize the civil union.
193. RESTATEMENT § 6(2)(d).
194. Id. § 6(2)(e).
195. Id. § 6(2)(f).
196. Id. § 6(2)(f) cmt. i.
197. Id. § 6(2)(g).
198. Leflar, supra note 115, at 1586-88.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL RESTRICIIONS
Once the Wisconsin court has reached a conclusion as to whether
Wisconsin would honor a Vermont civil union, the court must then
subject its choice to the constitutional test prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague1" and followed in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.' In addition, the Wisconsin Court will likely
be concerned with the guidelines imposed by the Federal Defense of
Marriage Act.'O'
A. Federal Defense of Marriage Act
Since its enactment in 1996, the Federal DOMA has spurred much
controversy.' The federal measure has two primary purposes: (1) to
define and protect the institution of marriage and (2) to guide and shield
the rights of the states in promulgating their own laws concerning same-
sex marriage.20 DOMA defines marriage as "only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
a wife."2° Furthermore, the act provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship. 5
199. 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (discussing convergence of due process and full faith and credit
analyses). Initially, the analyses under the Full Faith and Credit clause and the Due Process
requirements of the U.S. Constitution were discussed in two separate strands of cases;
however, the Supreme Court in Allstate eliminated the dichotomy and converged the analysis
into one single question. See id. Since then, the Supreme Court has applied the Allstate
analysis. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). This is the test I will
use in my discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
200. 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (noting that a court should conduct an examination to
determine whether the application of the laws of a state is constitutionally justified).
201. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified in
sections one and twenty-eight of the United States Code).
202. See, e.g, Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604, 620-21 (1997) (describing
argument by critics of DOMA).
203. Id. at 615-16; H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
204. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997).
205. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 2001).
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Making reference to the "threat[s]" and "legal assault" waged
against traditional heterosexual marriage, the legislative history reveals
Congress's sense of urgency in defining marriage as a heterosexual
union." Furthermore, Congress was particularly concerned with the
Full Faith and Credit Clause2" of the Constitution and whether states
would be required to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in
another state.2°' The underlying conclusion of the House Report
analyzing DOMA is that a state may refuse to recognize a same-sex
marriage performed outside its boundaries, if the state has a strong
public policy argument against such unions.2
Numerous commentators have attacked DOMA, arguing it is
unconstitutional because Congress cannot abridge the rights granted
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to the
states.10 On the other hand, some commentators have noted that much
of the criticism of DOMA has been unfounded and mistaken, since
DOMA does nothing more than simply restate the power granted to
states by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, DOMA may be "essentially irrelevant" to our inquiry."I
Defending or attacking the constitutionality of DOMA is beyond the
scope of this Comment. To fully analyze the hypothetical at hand, let us
assume that DOMA is constitutional, but indicative of Congress'
concerns about maintaining a more traditional definition of marriage.
B. Full Faith and Credit
More significant than DOMA, is the directive given to the states by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 2 While the
206. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
207. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
208. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
209. See id.
210. Chabora, supra note 202, at 620 (describing argument by critics of DOMA).
211. SCOLES, supra note 3, § 13.19, at 576 & n.14 (citing Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v.
General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional
Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 154-58 (1998)).
212. The intent of the Full Faith and Credit Clause appears to have been to provide a
sense of unity among the numerous states of the nation. ROBERT H. JACKSON, FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 29 (1945) (stating that "[b]y
the full faith and credit clause [our forefathers] sought to federalize the separate and
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language of the clause seems to clearly mandate that Wisconsin fully
recognize Vermont civil unions, the case law interpreting the clause has
diluted the directive of the clause to the point that the clause today
offers more of a guideline than a strong mandate.213
Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague214 and followed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts,215 the limits imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause are not
so strict. Shutts confirmed the Allstate court's observation that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause "provide[s] modest restrictions on the
application of forum law., 216 The Shutts court stated that a "State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. ,
217
Because Wisconsin courts have recognized and applied the
constitutional guidelines set by Allstate and Shutts, a Wisconsin court
will likely subject the choice of law inquiry to these guidelines. 28 As the
forum, a Wisconsin court will have little difficulty articulating
Wisconsin's interests in the litigation under discussion. The parties are
domiciled in Wisconsin and intend to continue to live in Wisconsin.
While the civil union took place in Vermont, Vermont had minimum
contact with the Wisconsin couple, who only traveled to Vermont for
the sole purpose of entering into the marriage-like union. One would be
hard-pressed to convince a court that it would be unconstitutional for
independent state legal systems by the overriding principle of reciprocal recognition of public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings").
213. As it stands today, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has lost much of its bite. The
strand of cases analyzing the Full Faith and Credit Clause prior to Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, evidence this shift. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, the Supreme Court
began moving away from an interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a strong
mandate to a balancing test analysis. See 286 U.S. 145 (1932). In Alaska Packers Assoc. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, the court noted that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a
balancing test; that is, a forum can apply its own law unless another state has a superior
interest. 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). Furthermore, the Court stated, a presumption existed that
the forum state could apply its own law unless the forum's interest were overridden by some
other states. Id. Four years later, in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
the court considerably weakened the Alaska Packers test, holding that an interested state can
always apply its law notwithstanding the interest of any other state. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
214. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
215. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
216. Id. at 818.
217. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,313 (1981)).
218. See, e.g., Sisters of St. Mary v. AAER Sprayed Insulation, Case No. 85CV5952,
Circuit Court for the Dane County, 1987 Wisc. App. LEXIS 4440 (Dec. 17, 1987), affd, 445
N.W.2d 723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
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Wisconsin to refuse to recognize the union. The couple would need to
convince the court that it would come as an "unfair surprise "2 19 and that
it would "fundamentally unfair"'' 0 if the Wisconsin court refused to
recognize their same-sex union. The couple's best chance would be to
invoke the various public policy arguments previously cited and argue
that recognizing the Vermont civil union is not only consistent with
Wisconsin's public policy, but also advances Wisconsin's interest in
promoting familial stability.
V. CONCLUSION
The hypothetical couple presented here may not be too far from
becoming a reality in our courts. As of May 2001, over 2043 couples
have flocked to Vermont to join in a civil union.2' Other states may
follow in Vermont's example. Although several states have been
debating the same-sex marriage controversy, Connecticut and Rhode
Island appeared to be the most promising candidates in early 2 0 0 1 .2 In
addition, the Vermont measure may lead to greater acceptance of same-
sex unions. Because of the Vermont developments, "the phrase same-
sex marriage no longer sounds like an oxymoron."2
Given the fact that Wisconsin does not have a statute specifically
prohibiting same-sex marriages and the fact that Wisconsin has
relatively progressive laws prohibiting discrimination against gays and
lesbians, our hypothetical couple may fare better in a Wisconsin court
than elsewhere. However, Wisconsin's conflict of law methodology is
not cogent, and the court may finesse its decision by picking out factors
from various methodologies that might lead to the desired result.
As evidenced throughout this Comment, choice of law issues are
murky and courts must often grapple with complex and various
219. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 828.
220. Id. at 837 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
221. See Miller, supra note 8 (observing that as of May 2001 the Vermont Department of
Vital Statistics had counted 2043 couples who had entered into civil unions in Vermont).
222. As of February 2001, Rhode Island and Connecticut legislatures were planning to
hold public hearings to consider civil union or same-sex marriage legislation. E.J. Graff, Civil
Unions are Homemaking Here for a Reason, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2001, at E3. But
following public hearings in March 2001, Connecticut gay rights activists appear to have
"reined in the effort." Lisa Prevost, Conn. Backs Away from Gay Unions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 5, 2001, at B5. One Connecticut lawmaker, State Representative Michael Lawlor,
believes that same-sex unions may become legal reality in Connecticut within a year or two.
Id.
223. Graff, supra note 222, at E3.
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theories. 4  Letting the courts decide whether couples such as our
hypothetical couple will be able to enjoy the rights and benefits of a civil
union outside the borders of Vermont may not be the best solution. The
clearest course may be for lawmakers in the elected governmental
bodies to enact legislation either similar to Vermont's civil union bill,
which would likely eliminate the conflict of law problem, or pass
legislation explicitly prohibiting all types of same-sex unions so that
couples are not subject to unfair surprise. Given Wisconsin's current
statutory law favoring gays and lesbians, and given failed efforts in the
Wisconsin legislature in approving a marriage recognition statute, the
latter course is unlikely in Wisconsin.
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